Two Truths, One Lie:
Constitutional Edition
Politicians say the Constitution shouldn't be changed. Academics say they know why it doesn't. One group is making excuses. The other diagnosed the disease. Citizens Before Politics was built to clear the noise and treat it.
The Founders Got It Right
Thomas Jefferson, writing from Paris in 1789, said it plainly: "The earth belongs in usufruct to the living." He argued every constitution should expire after 19 years. Anything longer "is an act of force, and not of right."
The Founders didn't just expect change. They built the mechanism for it. Article V exists because they knew they hadn't thought of everything.
It's Too Hard
For context: 71% of democracies use a two-thirds threshold to propose amendments — the U.S. isn't unusual there. But requiring three-fourths for ratification puts the U.S. among only 13% of democracies. Other democracies amend their constitutions about once every ten years. The U.S. hasn't passed an amendment in 34 years.
It Would Destabilize the Country
Meanwhile, the U.S. Constitution is 237 years old and has been amended only 27 times — making it one of the least-updated governing documents on Earth. Many democracies replace their constitutions entirely every 15 to 20 years.
When amendments do pass, they move fast. The 26th Amendment (lowering the voting age to 18) was ratified in about three months. The bottleneck isn't ratification. It's getting a serious proposal past the gatekeepers.
The High Bar Protects Minorities
The amendments that actually protected minorities — the 13th (abolishing slavery), the 14th (equal protection), the 15th (voting rights for Black men), the 19th (women's suffrage) — none passed because the system gently self-corrected. Every single one required a war, a century of activism, or both. They passed because the pressure became unsurvivable, not because the system was working.
Meanwhile, 83% of Americans say they don't trust the government to do the right thing most of the time.
The Courts Handle It
The Constitution is supposed to be the framework that sits above ordinary politics. When structural problems exist at the foundational level, legislating around them is like putting a band-aid on a cracked beam.
The result? A Supreme Court so politicized that every vacancy becomes a constitutional crisis. Major questions — abortion, campaign finance, voting rights — decided by 5-4 votes that shift with each new appointment. The Biden Commission on Supreme Court reform concluded that most proposals were unrealistic because of the "nearly impossible-to-amend American constitution."
That's not a stable system. That's a system where one branch absorbed the functions of another because the repair mechanism has been locked in a drawer.
A Convention Would Be a Runaway Convention
The convention push around 2015–2019 stalled not because a convention ran wild, but because state leaders couldn't agree on rules before it even started. The fear has been weaponized to kill reform before it begins.
The real question isn't "what if a convention goes too far?" It's "who benefits from making sure a convention never happens at all?"
It's Too Divisive Right Now
The Constitution exists precisely for moments when ordinary politics fails. It is meant to address structural failures — the kind of problems that can't be fixed by electing a different person or passing a different bill.
Every major amendment in American history passed during intense division: the Civil War amendments during Reconstruction, women's suffrage during the Progressive Era, the 26th Amendment during Vietnam. Division is not a reason to avoid structural reform. Division is usually the symptom that structural reform is overdue.
It's Simply Impossible
The 27th Amendment took 202 years to ratify — but it passed because one college student refused to accept "impossible."
There has never been a centralized system that tracks where Americans actually stand on specific constitutional changes. No way for citizens to see that they're not alone.
Congress Will Handle It
Of the roughly 11,985 amendments proposed in Congress through January 2025, the vast majority were introduced as symbolic gestures with no expectation of passage. When reform proposals do get introduced, they are routinely buried in committee — never reaching a floor vote, never receiving public debate.
This is the fox redesigning the henhouse.
The Bottom Line
These aren't conspiracy theories. They're peer-reviewed diagnoses from political scientists, constitutional scholars, and legal researchers. The amendment process isn't broken because Americans don't want change. It's broken because the system was designed for a smaller, less polarized nation, and the people who benefit from that design are the only ones authorized to fix it.
Citizens Before Politics doesn't ask permission from the gatekeepers. It built a parallel track. A track where citizens participate in constitutional amendments without waiting for Congress to care and then holds them accountable to push it through.
- Bell, P., & Bell, P. (2025, December 5). Public Trust in Government: 1958-2025. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2025/12/04/public-trust-in-government-1958-2025/
- America’s founding Documents. (2025, January 29). National Archives. https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs.
- Tsebelis, G. & Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA. (2021). Constitutional rigidity matters: A veto players approach. In British Journal of Political Science (Vol. 52, pp. 280–299) [Journal-article]. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123420000411
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- Elkins, Z. S. (2022). Underestimated but undeterred: the 27th Amendment and the power of tenacious citizenship. PS Political Science & Politics, 56(1), 158–163. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1049096522000816
- Pierson, P., & Schickler, E. (2020). Madison’s Constitution under stress: A Developmental analysis of Political Polarization. Annual Review of Political Science, 37–58. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-033629
- Sethi, A. & Faculty of Law, The University of Hamburg. (2023). Sub-constitutionally repairing the United States Supreme Court. In Common Law World Review (Vols. 52–52, Issue 4, pp. 128–149). https://doi.org/10.1177/14737795231205324
- Palanza, V., & Valarezo, P. S. (2023). Chile’s failed constitutional intent: Polarization, fragmentation, haste and delegitimization. Global Constitutionalism, 13(1), 200–209. https://doi.org/10.1017/s204538172300028x