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Two Truths, One Lie: 
Constitutional Edition

Politicians say the Constitution shouldn't be changed. Academics say they know why it doesn't. One group is making excuses. The other diagnosed the disease. Citizens Before Politics was built to clear the noise and treat it.

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01 / 09

The Founders Got It Right

The Excuse
The Constitution was crafted by unmatched political minds. Changing it dishonors their genius.
The Reality
The Founders were not prophets. They were colonists — lawyers, planters, merchants, and slaveholders with personal financial interests. 55 delegates showed up. Only 39 signed. They wrote the whole thing in four months after their first attempt failed. Average age: 42. Some were in their twenties. 

Thomas Jefferson, writing from Paris in 1789, said it plainly: "The earth belongs in usufruct to the living." He argued every constitution should expire after 19 years. Anything longer "is an act of force, and not of right." 

The Founders didn't just expect change. They built the mechanism for it. Article V exists because they knew they hadn't thought of everything.
The Fix
CBP treats the Constitution like what it is — a working document, not a museum piece. The drafting method here is the same one they used: study what failed, compare other governments, borrow what works.
 
02 / 09

It's Too Hard

The Excuse
The supermajority threshold exists to prevent hasty changes.
The Reality
Two-thirds of Congress to propose. Three-fourths of states to ratify. That means 13 states can block an amendment even if 37 support it. Justice Antonin Scalia calculated that roughly 2% of the population could theoretically block any amendment. His words: "It ought to be hard, but not that hard." 

For context: 71% of democracies use a two-thirds threshold to propose amendments — the U.S. isn't unusual there. But requiring three-fourths for ratification puts the U.S. among only 13% of democracies. Other democracies amend their constitutions about once every ten years. The U.S. hasn't passed an amendment in 34 years.
The Fix
CBP can't change Article V. But it can change the pressure equation. When millions of verified citizens vote on a specific proposal — and representatives are publicly asked to state their position before midterms — the political math shifts. Public pressure, made visible and undeniable, is the only force that has ever overcome supermajority thresholds.
 
03 / 09

It Would Destabilize the Country

The Excuse
Amendments have unintended consequences. Just look at Prohibition.
The Reality
Prohibition is always the example. And it proves the opposite point. The country tried something. It didn't work. They amended the Constitution again to undo it. That's not a bug. That's the feature. 

Meanwhile, the U.S. Constitution is 237 years old and has been amended only 27 times — making it one of the least-updated governing documents on Earth. Many democracies replace their constitutions entirely every 15 to 20 years. 

When amendments do pass, they move fast. The 26th Amendment (lowering the voting age to 18) was ratified in about three months. The bottleneck isn't ratification. It's getting a serious proposal past the gatekeepers.
The Fix
CBP removes the drafting bottleneck. Proposals arrive pre-drafted, built from previous U.S. amendment proposals and constitutional language from trusted democracies. Citizens don't write legal text from scratch. They review, vote, and suggest revisions.
 
04 / 09

The High Bar Protects Minorities

The Excuse
The supermajority requirement prevents mob rule from trampling minority rights.
The Reality
The supermajority requirement doesn't protect minorities. It protects incumbents. 

The amendments that actually protected minorities — the 13th (abolishing slavery), the 14th (equal protection), the 15th (voting rights for Black men), the 19th (women's suffrage) — none passed because the system gently self-corrected. Every single one required a war, a century of activism, or both. They passed because the pressure became unsurvivable, not because the system was working. 

Meanwhile, 83% of Americans say they don't trust the government to do the right thing most of the time.
The Fix
CBP strips out partisanship by design. Voting is anonymous — no party affiliation, no demographic tracking. A proposal either has majority support from verified American citizens or it doesn't. If citizens are united but politicians are not, CBP makes that gap visible before every election.
 
05 / 09

The Courts Handle It

The Excuse
Judicial interpretation evolves the Constitution without the risks of formal amendment. The system adapts through rulings, executive actions, and legislation.
The Reality
Court rulings can be reversed (Roe v. Wade, 2022). Executive orders can be undone with a signature. Legislation can be repealed with a simple majority. None of these carry the permanence of a constitutional amendment. 

The Constitution is supposed to be the framework that sits above ordinary politics. When structural problems exist at the foundational level, legislating around them is like putting a band-aid on a cracked beam. 

The result? A Supreme Court so politicized that every vacancy becomes a constitutional crisis. Major questions — abortion, campaign finance, voting rights — decided by 5-4 votes that shift with each new appointment. The Biden Commission on Supreme Court reform concluded that most proposals were unrealistic because of the "nearly impossible-to-amend American constitution." 

That's not a stable system. That's a system where one branch absorbed the functions of another because the repair mechanism has been locked in a drawer.
The Fix
CBP pushes for permanent, democratic solutions — actual amendments — rather than temporary workarounds. A Supreme Court ruling can be overturned. A constitutional amendment cannot.
 
06 / 09

A Convention Would Be a Runaway Convention

The Excuse
If Article V's convention process were ever used, there would be no way to limit its scope. Delegates could rewrite the entire Constitution.
The Reality
No Article V convention has ever been held, so the "runaway" fear is entirely hypothetical. It's also deeply ironic — the 1787 Convention itself was technically called only to revise the Articles of Confederation, and the delegates ended up writing a completely new Constitution. That "runaway" convention produced the very document these critics now call sacred. 

The convention push around 2015–2019 stalled not because a convention ran wild, but because state leaders couldn't agree on rules before it even started. The fear has been weaponized to kill reform before it begins. 

The real question isn't "what if a convention goes too far?" It's "who benefits from making sure a convention never happens at all?"
The Fix
CBP bypasses the convention debate entirely. Citizens don't need a convention to draft, review, or vote on amendment proposals. When a proposal passes with majority citizen support, CBP contacts every relevant representative and publishes their response (or silence) before midterm elections.
 
07 / 09

It's Too Divisive Right Now

The Excuse
Polarization makes this the wrong moment. Amendments are divisive. This isn't the time.
The Reality
If polarization is the reason not to amend, then it's never the right time. That's exactly the point. This argument is a permanent stall tactic. 

The Constitution exists precisely for moments when ordinary politics fails. It is meant to address structural failures — the kind of problems that can't be fixed by electing a different person or passing a different bill. 

Every major amendment in American history passed during intense division: the Civil War amendments during Reconstruction, women's suffrage during the Progressive Era, the 26th Amendment during Vietnam. Division is not a reason to avoid structural reform. Division is usually the symptom that structural reform is overdue.
The Fix
When politics is divided in a two-party system, so are the people. The only time problems get fixed is when people unite and demand it. CBP creates the infrastructure for that demand — visible, verified, and impossible to ignore.
 
08 / 09

It's Simply Impossible

The Excuse
The amendment process is too difficult. Nothing can change.
The Reality
The difficulty is real — but also overstated, and that overstatement has become self-fulfilling. Scholars note that the cultural message of futility reinforces itself: "whatever you do, don't amend the Constitution." People believe it's impossible, so they don't try, which makes it look impossible. 

The 27th Amendment took 202 years to ratify — but it passed because one college student refused to accept "impossible." 

There has never been a centralized system that tracks where Americans actually stand on specific constitutional changes. No way for citizens to see that they're not alone.
The Fix
CBP breaks the futility loop by making participation effortless. When citizens can see real-time results — "72% of verified Americans support this amendment" — the narrative flips from "impossible" to "inevitable." Visibility kills apathy.
 
09 / 09

Congress Will Handle It

The Excuse
The legislative process will address structural problems when needed.
The Reality
Congress controls the amendment gateway. The people who benefit most from the current structure decide whether to change it. Structural reforms like term limits, campaign finance reform, or Congressional stock trading bans directly threaten incumbent power. 

Of the roughly 11,985 amendments proposed in Congress through January 2025, the vast majority were introduced as symbolic gestures with no expectation of passage. When reform proposals do get introduced, they are routinely buried in committee — never reaching a floor vote, never receiving public debate. 

This is the fox redesigning the henhouse.
The Fix
CBP bypasses the Congressional gate entirely. Citizens don't need Congress's permission to draft, review, or vote on amendment proposals. Congress still holds the formal Article V power. But CBP creates a parallel track of democratic legitimacy that makes Congressional obstruction politically expensive.
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The Bottom Line

These aren't conspiracy theories. They're peer-reviewed diagnoses from political scientists, constitutional scholars, and legal researchers. The amendment process isn't broken because Americans don't want change. It's broken because the system was designed for a smaller, less polarized nation, and the people who benefit from that design are the only ones authorized to fix it.

Citizens Before Politics doesn't ask permission from the gatekeepers. It built a parallel track. A track where citizens participate in constitutional amendments without waiting for Congress to care and then holds them accountable to push it through.

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References
  1. Bell, P., & Bell, P. (2025, December 5). Public Trust in Government: 1958-2025. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2025/12/04/public-trust-in-government-1958-2025/
  2. America’s founding Documents. (2025, January 29). National Archives. https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs.
  3. Tsebelis, G. & Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA. (2021). Constitutional rigidity matters: A veto players approach. In British Journal of Political Science (Vol. 52, pp. 280–299) [Journal-article]. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123420000411
  4. Garoupa, N., & Botelho, C. S. (2021). Measuring procedural and substantial amendment Rules: an Empirical Exploration. German Law Journal, 22(2), 216–237. https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2021.2
  5. Blake, W. D., Cozza, J. F., Armstrong, D. A., & Friesen, A. (2023). Social capital, institutional rules, and constitutional amendment rates. American Political Science Review, 118(2), 1075–1083. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055423000606
  6. Elkins, Z. S. (2022). Underestimated but undeterred: the 27th Amendment and the power of tenacious citizenship. PS Political Science & Politics, 56(1), 158–163. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1049096522000816
  7. Pierson, P., & Schickler, E. (2020). Madison’s Constitution under stress: A Developmental analysis of Political Polarization. Annual Review of Political Science, 37–58. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-033629
  8. Sethi, A. & Faculty of Law, The University of Hamburg. (2023). Sub-constitutionally repairing the United States Supreme Court. In Common Law World Review (Vols. 52–52, Issue 4, pp. 128–149). https://doi.org/10.1177/14737795231205324
  9. Palanza, V., & Valarezo, P. S. (2023). Chile’s failed constitutional intent: Polarization, fragmentation, haste and delegitimization. Global Constitutionalism, 13(1), 200–209. https://doi.org/10.1017/s204538172300028x